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Abstract  
 
Urban violence is a major preoccupation of policy-makers, planners, and development 
practitioners in cities around the world. States routinely seek to contain such violence through 
repression and its exportation to and containment at the periphery of metropolitan centres. Yet 
urban violence is a highly heterogeneous phenomenon and not amenable to reified diagnosis 
and coercive intervention. Muscular state-led responses tend to overlook and conceal the 
underlying factors shaping the emergence of urban violence, as well as the motivations and 
means of so-called “violence entrepreneurs”. This is very obviously the case of urban gangs 
in Central America, which are regularly labelled a “new urban insurgency” threatening the 
integrity of governments and public order. This article considers both the shape and character 
of Central American gang violence and attempts at reducing it, highlighting the complex 
relationship between these two phenomena. We advance a threefold approach to measuring 
the effectiveness of interventions, focusing alternately on discursive, practical and outcome-
based criteria. In this way the article demonstrates how, contrary to their reported success in 
diminishing gang violence, repressive first generation approaches have tended instead to 
radicalise gangs, potentially pushing them towards more organised forms of criminality. 
Moreover, although credited with some modest successes, more preventive second generation 
interventions seem to have yielded more rhetorical advances than meaningful reductions in 
gang violence. 
 
 
Keywords 
 
gangs—crime—Central America—violence reduction—policy interventions 
                                                 
1 Oliver Jütersonke is Head of Research at the Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding (CCDP), 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland (Email: 
oliver.jutersonke@graduateinstitute.ch). Robert Muggah is Research Director of the Small Arms Survey at the 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and Research Fellow at the CCDP (Email: 
robert.muggah@smallarmssurvey.org). Dennis Rodgers is Senior Research Fellow at Brooks World Poverty 
Institute (BWPI), University of Manchester, UK and Research Fellow at the CCDP (Email: 
dennis.rodgers@manchester.ac.uk). The authors would like to thank the guest editors of this issue of Security 
Dialogue as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and suggestions on an earlier 
version of this article. 
. 
 1
REVISED VERSION – February 2009 
Urban Violence and Security Promotion in Central America 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Urban violence is fast emerging as one of the major preoccupations of policy-makers, 
planners, and development practitioners in cities and municipalities around the world (cf. UN-
HABITAT, 2007). Although targeted prescriptions to reduce armed violence are emerging 
from multilateral and bilateral agencies, research emphasises how urban violence is highly 
heterogeneous, multi-causal and not readily amenable to reified solutions (Small Arms 
Survey, 2007; Geneva Declaration, 2008). In particular, interventions designed to promote 
security often overlook the underlying determinants shaping the emergence and severity of 
urban violence, as well as the origins, motivations and means of so-called “violence 
entrepreneurs” (Collier et al., 2003). This is strikingly the case in relation to urban gangs 
throughout Central America. Their actions are routinely described as a “new urban 
insurgency” that threatens the integrity of governments and needs to be violently crushed (e.g. 
Manwaring, 2005; 2006). In some cases, gangs are explicitly connected to the surge in 
violence that accompanies narco-trafficking (US, 2008; CNN, 2009). This article argues that 
the reality may in fact be very different. The relationship between Central American urban 
gang violence and state-led attempts at violence reduction is not as straightforward as often 
portrayed.  
 
The article is divided into five parts. The opening section presents a panoramic overview of 
urban violence in Central America, emphasising the uneven distribution of urban violence, 
and how violence is conditioned by a range of proximate and structural factors. The next 
section issues a descriptive review of gangs in contemporary urban Central America, tracing 
their origins, their underlying logic, and the ways in which they are socially constructed as a 
“threat” to public order. The third and fourth sections critically assess so-called first and 
second generation violence reduction strategies—known as mano dura (“hard hand”) and 
mano amiga (“friendly hand”) respectively—adopted by public authorities in Central America 
to address urban gangs. The final section then introduces a threefold approach to measuring 
the effectiveness of gang-related interventions, focusing alternately on discursive, practical 
and outcome-based criteria.2 The analysis highlights how contrarily to their reported success 
in diminishing gang violence, first generation approaches have actually tended to radicalise 
the gangs, potentially pushing them towards more organised forms of criminality. Meanwhile, 
second generation interventions appear to be more rhetorical than practical in nature. 
 
I. Urban Violence in Central America 
 
Central America features amongst the highest rates of reported homicidal and criminal 
violence in Latin America and indeed the world. The annual global homicide rate was 
approximately 7 per 100,000 in 2004, while in South America it was 25 per 100,000 and in 
Central America it soared above 29 per 100,000 (Geneva Declaration, 2008; WHO, 2008; 
UNODC, 2009). In contrast to virtually every other region, South and Central America 
feature the fastest and most dramatic temporal escalation of (homicidal) armed violence since 
1999. Demographically, the perpetration of (and victimisation by) violence appears to be 
                                                 
2 This framework for measuring ‘effectiveness’ is drawn from Muggah and Krause (2006) and their analysis of 
peace support operations in Haiti.  
 2
REVISED VERSION – February 2009 
concentrated primarily among young males aged 15 to 34.3 And spatially, statistical 
assessments undertaken by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) have detected that 
households in cities with more than one million inhabitants were over 70 per cent more likely 
to be victimised than households in cities of between 50,000-100,000 inhabitants (Gaviria & 
Pagés, 2002: 190). In 2006, for instance, more than 40 per cent of reported homicides in 
Guatemala occurred in Guatemala City, home to less than 20 per cent of the country’s 
population (cf. Matute & García, 2007).  
 
This stereotype of young, increasingly violent men in big cities is frequently advanced 
by media and political commentators in order to render causal claims between 
urbanisation, violence, and gangs (Caldeira, 2000). As such, rampant urbanisation is 
said to lead to the growth of uncontrollable slums that foster criminal activity, the rise of 
gangs and ultimately, the violence (Brennan-Galvin, 2002; Buvinic & Morrison, 2005). 
Echoing this conventional wisdom, some criminologists and sociologists contend that 
urban density is robustly associated with crime and narco-trafficking since greater 
concentrations of people inevitably trigger competition over limited resources, 
expanding stresses and social anomie (Naudé et al., 2006: 73; van Dijk, 1998: 63; 
Glaeser & Sacerdote, 1996).4 Human geographers also tend to attribute spiralling rates 
of urban violence to unsustainable urbanisation and the resulting social and ecological 
disequilibrium (cf. Brennan, 1999).  
 
Nonetheless, there is reason to be cautious about proclaiming an immediate correlation 
between city size or density and rates of urban violence (Jütersonke et al., 2007, Rodgers, 
forthcoming b).5 The factors shaping the specific panorama of violence across Central 
America are wide-ranging, and certainly more complex than the simple model proposed 
above. The World Bank, for example, recently attributed the rise in Central American 
violence to “a complex set of factors, including rapid urbanization, persistent poverty and 
inequality, social exclusion, political violence, organized crime, post-conflict cultures, the 
emergence of illegal drug use and trafficking and authoritarian family structures” (World 
Bank, 2008a: 3). The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), for its part, 
emphasises the role of geography and weak institutions as aggravating rates of violence; with 
over 80 per cent of the US’s cocaine supply passing through Central America states from 
Andean production centres, it is little wonder that organised crime violence is deeply 
entrenched (UNODC, 2007: 38). For its part, the US government’s Joint Forces Command 
has honed in on narco-trafficking, weak institutions and porous borders as key factors shaping 
violence in neighbouring countries (US, 2008). 
 
Crucially, urban violence is both a result of, and a catalyst for, transformations in urban 
governance and spatial organisation (see Moser & Rodgers, 2005). In many middle and 
lower-income cities, for example, sections of slums and shantytowns have assumed the 
character of forbidden gang and crime zones beyond the control of public security 
                                                 
3 Although a worrying spike in violence directed against women is also emerging. For example, Guatemala 
reported more than 560 cases of female homicides registered in 2005, while in Honduras, more than 195 women 
were murdered during the same period and almost 80 in 2006 (Muggah & Stevenson, forthcoming).
4 The US government, for example, described the growth of gang and drug related violence in Mexico as an 
‘internal conflict’ observing that the “government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under 
sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the 
next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state.” See US (2008). 
5 Indeed, a recent global review of more than 67 major cities with populations ranging from 6,000 to 14 million 
persons revealed few clear patterns or trends (Geneva Declaration, 2008; UN-HABITAT, 2006; also Jütersonke 
et al., 2007: 165). 
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forces. As a result, middle- and upper-income residents may feel the need to build 
(higher) walls and elaborate (more expansive) security systems to shield themselves, 
giving rise to a Manichean landscape of ‘safe’ gated communities and ‘violent’ slums. 
Real and perceived violence mutually reinforce each other to create what Agbola (1997) 
aptly describes as an “architecture of fear”. The result is a fragmentation of public space, 
a progressive breakdown of social cohesion through the generation of new forms of 
spatial segregation and social discrimination, and potentially more violence. Urban 
violence can thus be understood as intricately linked to the structural dynamics of urban 
agglomeration, as well as to the competing interests of—and power relations among—
social groups. The next sections attempt to detail such a panorama through the lens of 
gangs and the policy responses they have engendered. 
 
II. The Gangs of Central America 
 
One of the most visible expressions of Central American violence is undoubtedly the gang. 
Although gangs as a social phenomenon have long featured in Central American societies, 
their growth and influence over the past two decades is unprecedented. In an effort to deal 
with them, regional and domestic policy-makers have sought to link gangs with the 
spectacular rise in urban violence and disorder more generally.6 Accusations range from 
homicide, muggings, theft, and intimidation, to rape, racketeering, extortion, kidnapping and 
the narcotics trade. Likewise, international observers are increasingly linking gangs to 
insurrection and internal conflict in so-called ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’ state: in 2005, for example, 
the US Army War College described the region’s gangs as constituting a “new urban 
insurgency” with the goal “to depose or control the governments of targeted countries” 
through “coups d’street” (sic).7 These sentiments were echoed in more recent publications of 
the US Department of Defence which called for the ‘stabilization’ of gang-inspired unrest 
(e.g. US, 2008).  
 
Although gangs are unquestionably a major concern in Central America, a closer inspection 
of sensationalist claims reveals how they are profoundly misunderstood (cf. Huhn et al. 
2006a). Certainly, reliable information about Central American gangs is scarce and official 
record keeping is problematic owing to underreporting, deficient data collection, and political 
interference (Huhn et al. 2006b: 8-13). Basic consensus on the size and scale of gang 
membership is similarly lacking. While official figures speak of some 69,000 gang members 
operating throughout the region, estimates from private sources and academics indicate that 
the number could be as high as 200,000 (UNODC 2007: 17, 60). Even the lower estimate 
implies that there are more gang members than military personnel in Central America: 
Nicaragua and Honduras register approximately 12,000 soldiers each, while El Salvador and 
Guatemala report 13,000 and 27,000 military personnel respectively (UNODC, 2007; Millett 
and Perez, 2005: 59).  
 
While quantitative estimates are suspect, a number of qualitative studies reveals how gangs 
play a central role in shaping the dynamics of urban violence across the region.8 Crucially, 
                                                 
6 According to UNODC (2007: 64), the total proportion of contemporary violence in the region attributable to 
gangs varies widely from 10 to 60 per cent. 
7 See Manwaring (2005; 2006). A follow-up report by the same author published in 2008 further contended that 
gang violence constituted “another kind of war (conflict) within the context of a ‘clash of civilizations’ …being 
waged …around the world” (Manwaring, 2008: 1). 
8 For an overview, see Huhn et al. (2006b); also Liebel (2004). The most comprehensive study is undoubtedly 
the one reported on in the three volumes produced by a conglomerate of Central American research institutes 
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though, these qualitative studies also highlight the tremendous diversity between countries 
and cities in the region. Specifically, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are experiencing 
much greater levels of gang violence than Costa Rica and Nicaragua, although it should be 
noted that violence in the latter is much more virulent than generally reported. Moreover, the 
distribution of violence within all of these countries varies across time and space, it appears, 
however, that the overwhelming burden of gang violence occurs in urban areas, including in 
particular capital cities.  
 
Gangs are very much urban manifestations, in large part because a critical demographic mass 
of youths is essential for them to emerge. Evidence suggests that up to 15 per cent of youths 
within gang-affected communities can end up joining—although most studies indicate that on 
average the figure is somewhere around three to five per cent. Gang sizes range from 15 to 
100 members with an average membership of 20 to 25 (ERIC et al. 2001; Rodgers, 2006a). 
Much like urban violence as such, gangs are not evenly distributed within cities. They are 
more likely to emerge in poorer areas, although the correlation between poverty and gang 
violence is neither causal nor systematic. Indeed, a study in Guatemala city found that 
neighbourhoods falling within the metropolis’ bottom income quartile suffered less gang-
related crime than neighbourhoods falling within the second-to-last quartile (PNUD, 2007). 
 
The vast majority of gang members are male.9 Nevertheless, there is evidence of female gang 
members and all-female gangs operating in Nicaragua and Guatemala (Rodgers, 2006a; 
Winton, 2007). The age range of gang members, however, is variable. For example, a 2001 
survey of 1,000 gang members administered by the Instituto Universitario de Opinión 
Pública (IUDOP) in El Salvador detected an average age of 20 and a mean entry age of 15. 
Nicaraguan gang members appear to fall between the age of 7 and 23, while the age range of 
Guatemalan and Honduran gang members is between 12 and 30. In interrogating their 
motives for joining the gang, the IUDOP assessment found that 40 per cent claimed to have 
done so in order to “hang out”, 21 per cent because they had gang member friends, and 21 per 
cent in order to evade family problems. The study also detected a partial correlation between 
youth unemployment and gang membership: only 17 per cent of gang members were 
employed, and 66 per cent actively characterised themselves as “unemployed” (Santacruz 
Giralt & Concha-Eastman, 2001). 
 
There are considerable challenges in pinpointing specific factors that explain gang 
mobilisation and membership. Reified “determinants” and proximate factors such as family 
fragmentation, domestic abuse, or a psychological constitution do not appear to be 
consistently significant. One factor that appears to systematically affect gang membership 
relates to religious affiliation, insofar as evangelical Protestant youths in Nicaragua tend not 
to join gangs (Rodgers, 2006a).10 By way of contrast, gang mobilisation tends to be linked to 
                                                                                                                                                        
(ERIC et al., 2001; 2004a; ERIC et al., 2004b). Three further overview studies have also been published 
recently: USAID (2006), Demoscopía (2007), and the work of the “Pandillas juveniles transnacionales en 
Centroamérica, México y Estados Unidos” project coordinated by the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de 
México’s (ITAM) Centro de Estudios y Programas Interamericanos (CEPI), available online at: 
http://interamericanos.itam.mx/maras/index.html. The country that has been studied in greatest depth is without 
doubt Nicaragua (see Rocha, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Rocha and 
Rodgers, 2008; Rodgers, 1997, 2000, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). 
9 The fact that most gang members are young men, and that Central America suffers the highest male youth 
homicide rates in the world (Pinheiro, 2006: 357), indirectly supports the notion that gangs are an important 
factor within the regional panorama of violence. 
10 It can be speculated that this is perhaps because the totalising nature of evangelical Protestantism is such that 
churches constitute a complete organisational framework for their members that is institutionally equivalent to 
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broad structural factors. These include, inter alia, pervasive machismo (many gang codes are 
clearly expressions of a heightened masculinity), high levels of social exclusion and 
horizontal inequality, legacies of authoritarianism and armed conflict (and their aftermath),11 
and the unregulated availability of weapons (it is estimated that there are over two million 
unregistered small arms in Central America).12 Likewise, gangs often make up for the 
comparatively weak presence of the state and concomitant governance deficits (Rodgers, 
2006a; Koonings & Kruijt, eds., 1999; 2004). Another significant structural variable is 
migration, including the deportation and return of convicts from North to Central America, 
discussed at more length below.  
 
Even if there is frequently a tendency to talk about Central American gangs generically, a 
distinction should be rendered between “maras” and “pandillas”. Maras constitute a 
phenomenon with trans-national origins, while pandillas are more localised, home-grown 
groups that are the direct inheritors of the youth gangs that have been a historic feature of 
Central American societies. Pandillas were initially present throughout the region during the 
post-conflict period, but are now only significantly visible in Nicaragua—and to a lesser 
extent in Costa Rica (where they are often called “chapulines”)—having been almost 
completely supplanted by maras in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
 
Although differentiated according to shape and character, the contemporary Central 
American-conflict pandilla phenomenon essentially originated as a local response to post-
conflict volatility. After demobilised combatant youths returned to their home communities 
and had to contend with heightened socio-economic uncertainty and insecurity, they 
coalesced as pandillas that were initially effectively vigilante-style neighbourhood self-
defence groups. From these relatively fluid and organic beginnings, they rapidly assumed 
specific behaviour patterns that included engaging in semi-ritualised forms of gang warfare. 
These clashes were themselves regulated by customary codes and expectations, including the 
protection of local community inhabitants (Rodgers, 2006a). Post-conflict pandillas were thus 
more numerous and violent than their predecessors, due in part to the military skills acquired 
during the war. They were also more institutionalised than before, developing hierarchies and 
rules that persisted in spite of heavy membership turn-over.13
 
The maras, on the other hand, are linked to specific migratory patterns. There are reportedly 
just two mara groups, the Dieciocho (18) and the Salvatrucha (MS), operating in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras. The maras emerged directly from the 18th Street gang in Los 
Angeles, a group initially founded by Mexican immigrants in the 1960s. The 18th Street gang 
expanded during the late 1970s and early 1980s as a result of the influx of mainly Salvadoran 
and Guatemalan refugees who sought to incorporate into the gang as a form of social 
inclusion. By the latter half of the 1980s, a rival—possibly splinter—group founded by a 
second wave of Salvadoran refugees emerged, known as the “Mara Salvatrucha” 
(“Salvatrucha” being a combination of “Salvadoreño” and “trucha”, meaning “quick-
                                                                                                                                                        
that provided by the gang. Faith also appears to play a “protective” function in the case of urban violence in Rio 
de Janeiro (Dreyfus et al., 2009).  
11 Despite the introduction of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in the wake of 
various peace agreements, large numbers of ex-soldiers and militia were only partially integrated back into 
civilian life. See Muggah (2009; forthcoming).  
12 See Godnick et al. (2002) for a description of arms collection activities throughout the region. 
13 “Maturing out” is a universal feature of youth gangs; as pandilleros in Nicaragua put it, “there are no old gang 
members” (Rodgers, 2000). There is evidence to suggest that this is not quite as clear-cut in the case of maras, 
which are widely reported to have gang members of up to 30 years old, and from which it is said to be very 
difficult to “retire” (see International Human Rights Clinic, 2007). 
 6
REVISED VERSION – February 2009 
thinking” or “shrewd” in Salvadoran slang). The Dieciocho and the Salvatrucha rapidly 
became bitter rivals, and frequently fought each other on the streets of Los Angeles. As levels 
of intolerance began to grow and US immigration legislation acquired a more restrictive 
character, US-based gang members were repatriated to Central America.14 Between 1998 and 
2005 the US deported almost 46,000 convicts to Central America, in addition to 160,000 
illegal immigrants caught without the requisite permit. Three countries—El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras—received over 90 per cent of the deportations from the US 
(USAID, 2006: 18-19). 
 
These deportee mareros rapidly reproduced the structures and behaviour patterns that had 
earlier provided them with support and security in the United States. They subsequently 
founded local “clikas”, or chapters, of their gang in their communities of origin, which in turn 
rapidly began to attract local youths and either supplanted or absorbed local pandillas.15 
Contrarily to sensationalistic media claims, although each clika is explicitly affiliated with 
either the Mara Dieciocho or the Mara Salvatrucha, and while clikas from different 
neighbourhoods affiliated with the same mara will often join together to fight other groupings 
claiming allegiance to the opposing mara, neither gang is a real federal structure, much less a 
transnational one. Neither the Dieciocho nor the Salvatrucha gangs answer to a single chain 
of command, and their “umbrella” nature is more symbolic of a particular historical origin 
than demonstrative of any real unity, be it of leadership or action. In many ways, the federated 
nature of the maras is more of an imagined social morphology than a real phenomenon, based 
on the fact that the steady flows of deportees from the US share a common language and 
reference points.16
 
The extent and scale of urban violence attributed to pandillas and maras is likely to be 
overstated. In contrast to the numerous alarmist accounts linking Central American gangs to 
migrant trafficking, kidnapping, and international organised crime, it is clear from qualitative 
studies that both pandillas and maras are principally involved in small-scale, localised crime 
and delinquency such as petty theft and muggings.17 Such activities are typically carried out 
on an inter-personal basis, although maras in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are also 
increasingly involved collectively in the extortion of protection money from local businesses 
                                                 
14 The two gangs were also heavily involved in the violence and looting that accompanied the 1992 Rodney King 
riots. The state of California soon implemented strict anti-gang laws, and prosecutors began to charge young 
gang members as adults instead of minors, sending hundreds to jail for felonies and other serious crimes. This 
was followed in 1996 by the US Congress’ Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Non-
US citizens sentenced to a year or more in prison were now to be repatriated to their countries of origin, and 
foreign-born American felons could be stripped of their citizenship and expelled once they served their prison 
terms. 
15 According to Demoscopía (2007: 49), deportee gang members are becoming a minority as the rate of 
deportation from the US declines, and adopting “veteran” functions, influencing mara behaviour through their 
prestige rather than actually taking part in gang activities. 
16 To this extent, although the maras can be conceived as loose networks of localised gangs, these do not 
necessarily communicate or coordinate either within or between countries. Certainly, there is little evidence of 
any cooperation between maras in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras, and even less with the original putative 
“mother gangs” in Los Angeles. Rather, the ties that exist are more akin to a sense of identity, founded 
organically on individuals’ common experience of gangsterism in the US, deportation, and stigmatisation in 
Central America.  
17 According to Ribando (2007: 1-2), “gangs are generally considered to be distinct from organized criminal 
organizations because they typically lack the hierarchical leadership structure, capital, and manpower required to 
run a sophisticated criminal enterprise. Gangs are generally more horizontally organized, with lots of small 
subgroups and no central leadership setting strategy and enforcing discipline. Although some gangs are involved 
in the street-level distribution of drugs, few gangs or gang members are involved in higher-level criminal drug 
distribution enterprises run by drug cartels, syndicates, or other sophisticated criminal organizations”.  
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and the racketeering of buses and taxis as they transfer through the territories they control. It 
is also true that their resort to high-calibre firearms including AK-47s and fragmentation 
grenades has increased the lethality of specific outcomes.18 Nonetheless, most pandilla and 
mara violence appears to be spatially circumscribed, isolated in large part to poorer peripheral 
communities from which the gangs emerge, and is also often inter-gang. 
 
While the scale and virulence of Central American gang violence may be less odious than 
widely claimed, the type of urban violence committed by pandillas and maras is qualitatively 
transforming. As mentioned above, Central America serves as a transit point for at least 80 
per cent of all cocaine shipments between the Andean region and North America (UNODC, 
2007). There is an increasing amount of evidence suggesting that the involvement of local 
gang members in drug trafficking and dealing is leading to both types of gangs evolving 
towards more violent behaviour patterns (Aguilar, 2006; International Human Rights Clinic, 
2007; Rodgers, 2006a; 2007b; Rocha, 2007a). Trafficking itself appears to be decentralised, 
with shipments passing from Colombia to Mexico between smaller localised Central 
American cartels, each extracting a cut. Maras and pandillas tend to serve as a local security 
apparatus for the smaller cartels, or as informally connected street vendors. Gangs are seldom 
involved in the large-scale or trans-national movement of narcotics, nor do they wholesale, 
although certain studies suggest that the leaders of these small, local cartels are often ex-gang 
members who have “graduated” (Rodgers, 2006a; 2007a). 
 
Gang violence is ultimately embedded in a wider crisis of exclusion and spatial segregation. It 
cannot be conceived narrowly as a function of rational choice or endogenous factors isolated 
to gang-affected communities. Owing to the scarcity of alternative (legal/legitimate) 
economic opportunities, some commentators describe survival in Central America, including 
for gang members, as “ruthless Darwinian competition” with tensions emerging over “the 
same informal scraps, ensur[ing] self-consuming communal violence as yet the highest form 
of urban involution” (Davis, 2004: 28; see also Rodgers, forthcoming a). Such processes are 
reinforced by new patterns of segregation and exclusion in the region’s cities as a result of 
liberal market-led urban renewal and design. These tend to lead to the proliferation of gated 
communities and closed condominiums, as well as the fortification of urban transport 
networks (Rodgers, 2004; 2008). Also affected are forms of municipal governance, 
exemplified by the intensive patrolling of a city’s wealthier neighbourhoods and transport 
hubs coupled with unpredictable, arbitrary, and often violent entrances of security forces in 
slums and poorer areas.19 These latter interventions precipitate localised conditions of terror 
and symbolically demonstrate the power of an elite-captured state (Rodgers, 2006b). The 
most visible facet of this new approach is the launching of a “war on gangs” by Central 
American governments over the past five years, the subject of the next section.  
 
III. Mano Dura: A war against gangs 
 
The opening salvo of the veritable “war on gangs” underway in Central America was El 
Salvador’s adoption of a “Mano Dura” (“Iron Fist”) policy in July 2003. A harbinger of 
repressive approaches to gang control, the Mano Dura approach advocated the immediate 
imprisonment (for up to five years) of youths as young as 12 who displayed gang-related 
                                                 
18 The 2001 IUDOP survey of Salvadoran gang members mentioned above, for example, found that 25 per cent 
of those questioned admitted to having committed a murder in the past year, while a further 25 per cent refused 
to answer the question. See Santacruz Giralt & Concha-Eastman (2001). 
19 This spatial segregation mirrors, in many ways, the favela slums of Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro (see Dreyfus 
et al., 2009).  
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tattoos or flashed gang signs in public. Between July 2003 and August 2004, roughly 20,000 
mareros were arrested, although approximately 95 per cent of them were eventually released 
without charge after the Mano Dura law was declared unconstitutional by the Salvadoran 
Supreme Court for violating the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) (Hume, 2007). A new “Mano Super Dura” package of anti-gang reforms was 
subsequently advanced, which respected the provisions of the UNCRC but stiffened the 
penalties for gang membership by lengthening prison sentences. Although under the new law 
the police required proof of active delinquent behaviour in order to arrest an individual, El 
Salvador’s prison population doubled in just five years, from 6,000 to 12,000 prisoners, 40 
per cent of whom are allegedly gang members (Hume, 2007). 
 
Other Central American states soon followed El Salvador’s lead. Honduran authorities 
implemented an analogous approach —“Cero Tolerancia” (“Zero Tolerance”)—in August 
2003. Inspired in part by former New York mayor Giuliani’s eponymous policy, it featured a 
reformed penal code and legislation that established a maximum 12-year prison sentence for 
gang membership. Eventually, however, the penalty was stiffened to 30 years, and provisions 
were made to securitise the response to gangs through intensified collaboration between the 
national police and the army during urban patrols. Meanwhile, Guatemala’s authorities 
adopted “Plan Escoba” (“Operation Broomsweep”) in January 2004, which although not as 
draconian as Mano Dura or Cero Tolerancia nevertheless featured provisions allowing 
minors to be treated as adults and the deployment of 4,000 reserve army troops in troubled 
neighbourhoods in the capital. For its part, Nicaragua regularly implemented a range of anti-
gang initiatives from 1999 onwards, although these were of a considerably “softer” nature.20 
While these crackdowns were very popular amongst the general public in all Central 
American countries, they were also vigorously opposed by human rights groups. More 
ominously, entities such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International presented 
evidence—corroborated by the US State Department in 2005—of the existence of 
paramilitary death squads in Honduras and El Salvador that are deliberately targeting gang 
members, and often youths more generally, moreover in collusion with state authorities (see 
Faux, 2006). 
 
Central American states have also initiated unprecedented forms of cross-border cooperation 
in order to deal with assumed transnational linkages amongst gangs. In September 2003, a 
regional summit of heads of state declared that gangs were “a destabilising menace, more 
immediate than any conventional war or guerrilla” (cf. Rodgers, forthcoming a). By early 
2004, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua agreed to lift legal barriers to the 
cross-country prosecution of gang members, whatever their nationality. By mid-2005, the 
Presidents of El Salvador and Guatemala decided to establish a joint security force to patrol 
gang activity along their common border. The Central American states also sought to involve 
the United States which, though initially reluctant to adopt an assertive role, soon assumed a 
more muscular and aggressive approach following the proliferation of unfounded allegations 
connecting gangs to “terrorist groups” such as Al Qaeda and the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) in 2004 and 2005.21 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has 
                                                 
20 Although Nicaragua has gained a reputation for focusing on “preventative” rather than “repressive” anti-gang 
policies, empirical evidence of its practices tends to belie this (see Rocha, 2007c), even if overall the police 
response to gangs has not been as violent as in other Central American countries, partly because of the less 
violent nature of the pandillas compared to the maras. 
21 In early 2004, for example, the Honduran minister of Security, Oscar Alvarez, rather ludicrously claimed that 
a suspected Saudi member of Al Qaeda, Yafar Al-Taya was harbouring connections with gang leaders. In April 
2005, he followed this up with a new (and no less ludicrous) claim to have thwarted a Colombian FARC-mara 
plot to kill President Ricardo Maduro. 
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created a special task force focusing on Central American gangs, and has announced the 
creation of a liaison office in San Salvador to coordinate regional information-sharing and 
anti-gang efforts.  
 
Inevitably, hard-handed measures are frequently supported by the public owing to the 
visibility such interventions afford.22 But while official reports claim that anti-gang initiatives 
generate significant reductions in criminal violence, most evidence indicates that these effects 
are temporary and tenuous. Crack-down operations against gangs tend to generate perverse 
effects—including a greater predisposition to excessive acts of brutality and new forms of 
adaptation to avoid capture. Indeed, repressive tactics frequently encourage members to 
become more organised and violent,23 as is well illustrated by escalatory violence in 
Honduras in the wake of Mano Dura.24 Similarly processes have been reported in El Salvador 
and Guatemala.  
 
At the same time, the “war on gangs” has reportedly encouraged a number of maras to adapt 
and alter their behaviour in favour of less violent ways, and indeed, an increasing number of 
studies suggest that gangs are attempting to become less conspicuous. For example, gang 
members in El Salvador now tend to deploy less obvious signs and symbols, abandoning their 
tattoos and short-cropped hairstyles to avoid detection. Others are more mobile: the 
emigration of maras into Southern Mexico is widely attributed to repressive policies in 
Central America (Aguilar & Miranda, 2006: 49). More generally, gangs are widely reported 
as being less involved in crimes such as homicides. El Salvador’s reported homicide rate of 
41 deaths per 100,000 people in 2004 for example rose to almost 60 by 2007, while the 
proportion of these homicides deemed to be related to gangs simultaneously declined, for 
example (Reisman, 2008). While such changes are interpreted by some analysts as evidence 
that gangs are “losing” ground to the authorities, there are indications that this may not be the 
case. 
 
The transformation of Nicaraguan pandillas between the 1990s and the 2000s is a case in 
point. These gangs shifted from efforts to create localised forms of social order and belonging 
to becoming organisations promoting parochial forms of drug dealing instead. Rather than 
protecting local neighbourhood inhabitants, gangs acted to ensure the proper functioning of 
local drug economies in line with the interests of their members and associated local 
dealers—more often than not ex-gang members—through the imposition of localised regimes 
of terror based on fear, threats, and widespread acts of arbitrary violence (see Rodgers, 2006a; 
2007a; 2007b). By 2007, however, pandillas seemed to be disappearing, as most gang 
members were “retiring” and not being replaced by a new generation, with a small minority 
joining more professional and de-territorialised criminal organisations associated with 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Forter (2004), who surveyed perceptions of violence and victimisation among citizens in El 
Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.  
23 Aguilar & Miranda (2006: 42). The Central American Coalition for the Prevention of Youth Violence 
(CCPVJ) has shown that Mano Dura policies can be linked to a dramatic surge in youth violence—up to 40 per 
cent in the first three years of implementation—in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras (Gutiérrez, 2006). 
24 On 30 August 2003, one month after the promulgation of the new anti-gang legislation, gang members 
attacked a bus in the Northern city of San Pedro Sula in broad daylight, killing 14, and leaving 18 wounded, as 
well as a note to President Ricardo Maduro ordering him to withdraw the law. The following month, in the town 
of Puerto Cortes, a young woman’s head was found in a plastic bag with a note addressed to President Maduro 
saying that this was a response to the extrajudicial assassination of a gang member by the police. Over the course 
of the following year, more than 10 decapitated corpses were left in various cities with messages from gang 
members to the Honduras president, each time in response to a putative extrajudicial killing, and on 23 
December 2004, in Chamalecon, gang members again attacked a bus and killed 28, once again leaving a 
message claiming revenge for the May 2004 death of 105 gang members in a prison following a suspect fire. 
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narcotics trafficking. This professionalisation is ominous, insofar as the corrosive role that 
organised crime can play in developing contexts is extremely well-known (cf. Glenny, 2008). 
 
IV. Mano Extendida: A new paradigm? 
 
There appears to be a subtle shift from what we describe as “first” to “second generation” 
policies of containing urban gang violence in Central America. As the previous section 
showed, first generation initiatives such as Mano Dura can be characterised as security-, or 
enforcement-, first. They combine aggressive, militarised crack-down operations with 
increased penalties to deter gang membership. Interventions are executed by the state security 
apparatus and are combined with frequently draconian reforms to the judicial and penal 
process. Rehabilitative and developmental programmes are weakly supported, if at all. 
Paradoxically, first generation policies tend to contribute to and exacerbate the routine 
stigmatisation of gang members, thus preventing their reform and ultimately meaningful 
reintegration into society. Owing in large part to mounting criticism and evidence of these 
perverse effects, Mano Dura programmes are in some cases giving way to—but not replaced 
by—Mano Amiga (“friendly hand”) and Mano Extendida (“extended hand”) interventions. In 
theory, these second generation interventions focus not just on symptoms, but also risks of 
gang violence. They are typically ‘voluntary’ and place a greater emphasis on generating 
compliance through a combination of incentives.25  
 
 
Figure 1: Second Generation Armed Violence Reduction 
 
 
As the figure above shows, second generation activities come in a range of shapes and sizes. 
Such interventions feature host of activities ranging from voluntary weapons collection, 
temporary firearms carrying restrictions, and alcohol prohibitions, to environmental design in 
slums and targeted education and public health initiatives focusing on “at-risk youth” and 
even single female-headed care-giving households. Examples in Central America include 
APREDE (Alianza para la Prevención del Delito) in Guatemala, which stresses community 
approaches to reinserting gang members, JHAJA (Jóvenes Hondureños Adelante, Juntos 
Avancemos), offering employment opportunities in the formal and informal sectors for ex-
gang members, and Homies Unidos, a collective of ex-gang members in El Salvador working 
with youth and gang members to highlight alternatives to violence, but also to transfer 
marketable skills.  
 
While varying in intent and design, second generation efforts feature an evidence-led and 
“integrated” approach to urban violence prevention and reduction. Because action plans tend 
to be formulated by municipal authorities and service-providers in concert with public and 
private security actors, academic institutions, and civil society, they can also unconsciously 
adopt a more participatory and inter-sectoral approach. These interventions purposefully seek 
to build-up confidence and legitimacy from below through the deliberate engagement of local 
actors. They are dependent, however, in large part on comparatively robust and credible local 
public authorities and civil society engagement—institutions that may nevertheless be 
weakened by prolonged episodes of chronic violence (Muggah, forthcoming).  
 
                                                 
25 See, for example, Colletta & Muggah (forthcoming) for a review of second generation security promotion, 
including gang violence reduction programmes.  
 11
REVISED VERSION – February 2009 
Building interventions on the basis of a grounded appreciation of local context is a key 
innovation of these second generation interventions. For example, community-driven 
demobilisation and reintegration activities targeting erstwhile gang members, community, and 
targeted weapons collection initiatives all emphasise the importance of building on local 
values and norms associated with the reproduction of gangs and gang violence. At best, they 
aim to reinforce coordinated public and private sector responses and to provide mentorship, 
risk education, and alternative livelihoods for would-be perpetrators and victims, especially 
boys and young men, in poor and marginal communities (WOLA, 2008).26 But where 
partnerships with the public are developed in deliberative or factional ways, the marginalised 
may be excluded, and partnerships themselves may fall under the sway of more powerful 
local groups and political associations that seek to influence these institutions (Muggah and 
Jütersonke, forthcoming). 
 
V. From rhetoric to outcomes: Assessing the effectiveness of second 
generation interventions 
 
While neatly packaged in theory, second generation interventions have yet to prove 
themselves in practice. We outline a threefold approach to determining their effectiveness. 
The first element is discursive and considers how second generation approaches feature (or 
not) in normative declarations, such as legislation, decrees, policies, and public statements. 
Assessing discursive effects entails an interpretive approach in order to determine how these 
initiatives are distinguishable from prior activities and the way in which they delimit a 
“discursive field in which specific policy initiatives can be pursued in a coherent way” 
(Muggah and Krause, 2006: 131). A second benchmark to measure effectiveness is 
practical—whether there is evidence of qualitatively new initiatives, new modes of acting and 
behaving, and new actors and coalitions. In other words, are rhetorical commitments being 
converted into deeds? The third and arguably most important criterion relates to the outcomes 
of second generation activities—are they contributing to meaningful improvements in safety 
and security such as reductions in homicidal violence and visible decreases in gang 
membership? While such information is of course difficult to assemble, it is nevertheless 
crucial to (measuring) the “success” of the second generation enterprise itself.  
 
When considering discursive shifts, it remains unclear the extent to which second generation 
initiatives truly comprise a transformation in Central American policy culture. In a uniquely 
detailed study mapping out the incentives governing the institutional and organisational 
framework regarding youth violence reduction in Nicaragua, for example, Rocha (2007c) 
judged the government’s discursive promotion of second generation policies to be principally 
aimed at appeasing potential foreign donors and securing international funds. In practice, 
however, government action remained ostensibly “first generation” in nature, even if not as 
violent as its Northern Central American counterparts, where similar dynamics are evident. 
Nevertheless, second generation initiatives are clearly being heavily promoted by multilateral 
and bilateral development agencies working in the region, and are part of a new conceptual 
consensus within policy circles that cannot be ignored (Muggah and Stevenson, forthcoming). 
It could be the case that the much anticipated rhetorical turn has yet to fully take hold.,  
 
                                                 
26 Other gang-violence reduction programmes that appear to have contributed to sharp reductions in armed 
violence in the US include ‘Identity’ (Montgomery County, Maryland), Community Mobilization Initiative 
(Herndon, Virginia) and Gang Intervention Partnership (Columbia Heights, Washington DC). Examples of 
Central American activities include Group Ceiba (Guatemala), Paz y Justicia (Honduras) and Equipo Nahual (El 
Salavador). 
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At the level of practice, even where levels of financial investment in first generation 
initiatives far surpass those being accorded to second generation programmes (Hartnett, 2008: 
5), examples of the latter are clearly being implemented in the region, particularly by 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies. Under the rubric of “citizen security” and 
“violence reduction”, the World Bank, IADB27, World Health Organisation (WHO), 28 the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Habitat Programme 
(UNHABITAT), the UN Office for Drug and Crime Control (UNODC) and others are 
invested in an array of activities designed to promote greater compliance and a focus on 
voluntary approaches to addressing urban violence and gangs. For example, the World Bank 
developed a Small Grants Programme for Violence Prevention (SGPVP) in 2005 as part of a 
wider crime and violence prevention initiative, which included a focus on gangs. In keeping 
with the second generation framework outlined above, the agency seeks to support 
“community-based” and municipally-driven approaches to reducing weapons availability and 
re-engineering the attitudes and behaviour of gangs who might use them. In 2006, eleven out 
of 100 project grants were received in Honduras and Nicaragua to prevent gang violence and 
empower vulnerable urban communities.29 Table one schematically reviews a sample of first 
and second generation initiatives that have been implemented in Central America during the 
past decade. 
 
Table 1: From first to second generation violence prevention in Central America 
 
It is perhaps at this level of ‘practice’ that second generation activities are most visible. 
Owing to the trans-national dynamics of gang violence, a number of regional second 
generation activities are fast emerging. Examples of this include the SICA (Sistema de la 
Integración Centroamericana—Central American Integration System) and UNDP-led armed 
violence prevention activities. Similarly, the REDCEPAZ (Red Centroamericana para la 
Construcción de la Paz y la Seguridad Humana—Central American network for the 
Construction of Peace and Human Security)  consists of a constellation of non-governmental 
organisations active throughout Central America. The networks undertakes a wide variety of 
activities that might reduce weapons supplies (through amnesties and voluntary collection), 
promote activities for at-risk youth (peer-to-peer mentoring and reintegration programmes), 
and advocate enhanced national and sub-regional policies associated with violence reduction 
(by enhancing legislation in line with international sandards).30 Likewise, in Central America, 
an Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (IACPV) was launched in 2000. 
Comprised of a collection of internationally- and regionally-focused organisations, it 
advocates for strategies intended to confront criminal violence with non-coercive strategies in 
the Americas (IACPV, 2008).  
                                                 
27 The IADB has supported large-scale citizen security and crime prevention interventions in Latin America and 
the Caribbean since the late 1990s and developed considerable expertise in this regard. 
28 The TEACH-VIP curriculum, developed by WHO and a network of injury prevention experts in 2004 (WHO, 
2008), and TEACH-VIP Youth developed by PAHO and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) (cf. Muggah 
and Stevenson, forthcoming), serve as key training components for medical professionals, students and partners 
in El Salvador in terms of violence prevention and care. 
29 Among the projects selected by the World Bank are: A Smile without Violence (Honduras); Strengthening of 
Productive Businesses Belonging to Former Gang Members (Honduras); Promoting Peaceful Living and 
Conflict Negotiation in Schools with the Participation of Girls, Boys and Adolescents (Nicaragua); and Looking 
for a Change: Violence Prevention Contribution in Five Municipalities of Chinandega (Nicaragua). See World 
Bank (2008b). 
30 Key members of this network include the Arias Foundation (Costa Rica), FESPAD (El Salvador), CIPRODEH 
(Honduras), IEEPP and CEI (Nicaragua), IEPADES (Guatemala), and SERPAJ (Panama). This group of 
organisations share tasks, funding, and priorities, as well as national and technical expertise relating to 
publications, information exchange, meetings, and other forms of collaboration. 
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When it comes to outcomes, however, there is comparatively meagre evidence of effective 
impacts across time and space. Indeed, in the Central American countries that now long ago 
emerged from war, including Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador, homicidal violence 
appears to be rising or remaining stable––sometimes equivalent to peak periods of armed 
conflict.31 For example, El Salvador’s national homicide rate was 45.5 per 100,000 in 1995. 
By 2005, the rate had actually risen to 48.8 per 100,000. More alarming, the homicide rate 
among El Salvador’s youth population rose from 74.7 per 100,000 to 92.3 per 100,000 over 
the same period (Waiselfisz, 2008). Likewise, in Guatemala, the national homicide rate 
increased from 20.9 per 100,000 (1995) to 28.5 per 100,000 (2005) and from 29.2 per 
100,000 to an astonishing 55.4 per 100,000 for youths. By comparison, national and youth 
(homidide) rates have fallen dramatically in Mexico and Colombia.32 While a more effective 
spatial unit of analysis to measure the outcomes of second generation activities would be the 
city and in particular the poorer, slum areas, such data is seldom available.  
 
Indeed, in spite of an avowed commitment to evidence-based approaches, most second 
generation activities have so far failed to develop comprehensive and robust monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms. Indicators are also frequently poorly developed, documented, and 
analysed. Generally, there is little empirical evidence that second generation approaches are 
actually achieving major change beyond the rhetorical (Barnes, 2007). And while absence of 
evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence, there are few empirical assessments 
measuring clear correlates between second generation interventions and corollary reductions 
in homicidal violence or real and perceived victimisation. To the contrary, just as there is a 
sense among critics that first generation interventions appear to radicalise gangs rather than 
destroy them, there is some concern that second generation interventions tend to be all smoke 
and no fire.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Gangs constitute a real but much misunderstood feature of the Central American panorama of 
urban violence. While there is little doubt that they are involved in significant levels of 
violence, gangs are highly heterogeneous and connected more to localised insecurity rather 
than the transnational menace ascribed to them by the media and certain policy-makers. 
Although they are fundamentally connected to certain deep-seated issues such as the long 
legacy of war, machismo, and the availability of small arms in the region, they are also the 
consequence of increasing (regional and national) inequality and exclusion, and as such a 
reflection of deeply iniquitous social processes. A growing cadre of researchers are 
highlighting broad social and economic phenomena such as exclusion, marginalisation, rapid 
social change, and lack of opportunities as the central determinants shaping the contemporary 
emergence of gangs in Central America. 
 
Central America’s heavy-fisted attempts to arrest its gang trouble is not working. Instead, the 
repressive approach adopted by most governments in the region appears to have exacerbated 
the problem, precipitating a tit-for-tat spiral of violence and radicalising actual and would-be 
                                                 
31 Since the end of civil war in all three countries there has been an explosion of criminal violence—especially in 
urban areas. Although under-reporting and under-recording is significant, in Nicaragua, for example, the 
absolute number of crimes tripled between 1990 and 2003. Crime perception surveys confirm rising fear 
amongst the population at large. See Rodgers (2004).  
32 Waiselfisz (2008) observes that national homicide rates in 1995 were 64 and 17.3 per 100,000 for Colombia 
and Mexico respectively. By 2005, the rates had declined to 43.8 and 9.3 per 100,000.  
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gang members. Seen more broadly, these actions reflect a progressive securitisation of social 
space anticipated by Agamben (2005). They also forecast the exceptionalism of security-first 
responses to problems of under-development and the way they expand opportunities for a 
(liberal) minority at the expense of the majority (Duffield, 2008). Repression cannot remedy 
the underlying societal contradictions that generated the gangs in the first place, and are 
instead contributing to the escalation of more organised—and in some cases, flagrantly 
violent—crime. Much has been said and written about a newly emerging “second generation” 
of policy responses to gangs. Adopting a multi-pronged approach to measuring effectiveness, 
this article has demonstrated that such initiatives—far from serving as a panacea—have in 
fact yielded mixed results. While there is piece meal evidence of certain discursive and 
practical gains, the outcomes of second generation efforts to reduce urban gang violence are 
still far from clear.  
 
There is a recurring challenge facing those who seek to support gang violence reduction 
initiatives. This is that the design and implementation of social policy within any given set of 
circumstances will inevitably mirror the political dispensations and economic dynamics of the 
context in question. As such, arguably the single biggest obstacle to developing a coherent 
approach to urban gang violence in Central America is the deeply entrenched oligarchic 
nature of the societies in the region. This takes strategic intervention beyond the relatively 
straight-forward dilemmas associated with policy paralysis, particularly given that Central 
American governments can be seen as very much undertaking their visible and widely-
publicised crackdowns on gangs in order to avoid taking action on much more tricky issues 
related to exclusion, inequality, and the lack of job creation. Put another way, it seems that 
gangs have become convenient scapegoats on which to blame the isthmus’ problems and 
through which those in power attempt to maintain an unequal status quo. At the same time, 
however, they also simultaneously embody the risks of violent social action that will 
inevitably erupt in the face of attempts to preserve an unjust society. 
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